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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)O).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
Under Utah precedent, if an individual is injured in her employer's parking lot
while on her way into work, she is deemed to be in the course of her employment. Utah's
Workers' Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy for injuries sustained "in the
course of or because of or arising out of the employee's employment." Utah Code Ann.§
34A-2-105(1). Accordingly, did the trial court correctly hold that Appellant's claims
against her co-employee, Alice Nelson, were barred by exclusive remedy provision of
Utah's Workers' Compensation Act for injuries Appellant sustained when her coemployee hit her in their employer's parking lot on while on their way into work?
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court of Appeals reviews the District Court's grant of summary judgment for
correctness, giving no deference to the District Com1's rulings on the issues. See Utah

Home Fire Ins. Co. v. Manning, 1999 UT 77, ,r 8, 985 P.2d 243.
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-l 05
Hope v. Berrett, 756 P.2d 102 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
Soldier Creek Coal Co. v. Bailey, 709 P.2d 1165 (Utah 1985)
PRESERVATION
This issue was preserved in the District Court's Order granting Appellee's
Summary Judgment Motion. (R. 372-75.)

@)

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS & STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(1)
(I) The right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for injuries
sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, is the
exclusive remedy against the employer and is the exclusive remedy against
any officer, agent, or employee of the employer and the liabilities of the
employer imposed by this chapter is in place of any and all other civil
liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to the employee or to the
employee's spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, next of kin,
heirs, personal representatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever,
on account of any accident or injury or death, in any way contracted,
sustained, aggravated, or incurred by the employee in the course of or
because of or arising out of the employee's employment, and an action at
law may not be maintained against an employer or against any officer,
agent, or employee of the employer based upon any accident, injury, or
death of an employee ....
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arises out of an automobile/pedestrian accident between co-employees in

Ci

an employee parking lot. Specifically, Appellant, Mar:jorie Brown, was hit by her coemployee, Alice Nelson, while in their employee parking lot headed into their office
building.
As a result of this accident, and despite Utah's Workers' Compensation Act
barring Appellant from filing negligence claims against her co-employee for injuries
sustained on their employer's premises, Appellant filed a third-party negligence case
against Ms. Nelson, who is now deceased.
Based on the restrictions in Utah's Workers' Compensation Act, and the virtually
factually identical precedent set forth by this Court in Hope v. Berrett, 756 P .2d I 02
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), Ms. Nelson's estate filed a Summary Judgment Motion seeking

2

dismissal of Appellant's inappropriately filed "third-party" negligence claim against Ms.
Nelson.
Under the clear precedent and sound reasoning set forth in Hope, the District
Court granted the Summary Judgment Motion and dismissed Appellant's negligence
claims filed against her co-worker.

Appellant appeals the District Court's decision,

@

requesting that this Court replace the well-established, liberal standards of detennining
"employees" in Workers' Compensation cases with the stricter, unrelated "employee"
standard applied in third-party vicarious liability cases.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Parties, Employment, and IRS Facilities:
On January 30, 2012, Appellant Marjorie Brown was employed by the Internal
Revenue Service, located at 1973 North Rulon Whit Boulevard, Ogden, Utah ("the IRS
Building"). (R. 101-02.) Ms. Brown had been employed by the IRS since 2007. (R.
101.)

On that same date, Appellee, Alice Nelson, who is now deceased, was also

employed by the IRS and worked at the IRS Building. (R. I 03.)
The IRS Building had an adjoining parking lot designated for IRS employees ("the
Employee Parking Lot"), including Ms. Brown and Ms. Nelson.

(R. 102.)

The

Employee Parking Lot was surrounded by a single-entrance fence. (R. I 02; see also
photographs of the IRS Building and adjoining fenced Employee Parking Lot (R. 14547 .).) The only way to enter the IRS Building is to first enter the fenced-in Employee
Parking Lot. (See id.)

3
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In order to enter the Employee Parking Lot, individuals were required to present a
current employee badge to get past a guard. (R. 102.) The Employee Parking Lot was
patrolled by guards and German Shepherds, and Employees were not pennitted to bring
weapons into the Employee Parking Lot. (R. 122, p. 23 I. 18 - p. 24 I. 9.) Employee's
also used the Employee Parking Lot for fire drills that required evacuating the IRS
Building. (R. 122, p. 2111. 10-15.)
As testified by Appellant during her deposition, and illustrated in photographs of
the IRS Building showing the Employee Parking Lot and the surrounding, guarded fence,
the Employee Parking Lot and the IRS Building were both used by IRS employees in
@

conjunction with their employment. (R. 102, 121-24, and 145-47.)

The Accident:
On January 30, 2012, Appellant entered the Employee Parking Lot in her van, on
her way into work.

(R. 102.) After parking her van, Appellant was walking in the

Employee Parking Lot on her way into the IRS Building for work when she was involved
in an automobile/pedestrian accident with the now deceased Ms. Nelson ("the
Accident"). (R. 101-03.)
As a result of the Accident, the Office of Worker's Compensation Programs,
~

Department of Treasury holds a lien for amounts paid for this on-the-job injury. A fact
undisputed by Ms. Brown at the trial com1. (R. 248.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Under Utah's well-established Workers' Compensation Act, an employee who is
injured by a co-employee on their employer~s premises may not file a third-party
4

negligence claim against her co-employee. This principle is made abundantly clear in
Utah's statutes and controlling case law. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(1)
(2008); Hope v. Berrett, 756 P.2d 102 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); and Soldier Creek Coal Co.

v. Bailey, 709 P.2d 1165 (Utah 1985).
In this case, Appellant, Marjorie Brown, and her co-employee, Alice Nelson, were
involved in an automobile/pedestrian accident in their employer's parking lot, while they
were both headed into their employer's building to begin their workday. As set forth in

Hope, a case that is virtually identical to this case, an accident that occurs on an
employer's premises between coworkers, cannot give rise to a third-party claim between
the coworkers.

Appellant ignored the Workers' Compensation exclusive remedy

provision, as well as the legal precedent set forth in Soldier Creek, and Hope, and filed a
third-party negligence claim against her Ms. Nelson, her co-worker. In light of the clear
and controlling authority, the District Court appropriately dismissed Appellant's thirdparty suit against her co-employee, Alice Nelson.
Appellant recognizes the mirrored facts between this case and Hope, and therefore
Appellant argues that Hope has been ( or otherwise should be) overruled, and replaced
with the more strict standard of detennining employee status used in non-employee,
third-party vicarious liability cases. However, such an application would not only be
unprecedented, it would abolish the intent and policy behind Utah's Workers'
Compensation Jaws. Appe11ant's application would improperly permit injured employees
to avoid the exclusive remedy provision provided as a protection for employers and co:..

5
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employees against such actions. This Court should not accept Appellant's invitation to

Gi

pioneer a new, stricter, and destructive standard to Workers' Compensation cases.
Lastly, Appellant's claim that factual issues exist are untrue.

The clear,

undisputed facts of this case show that Appellant and Alice Nelson were coworkers, that
they were involved in an accident in an employee parking lot while headed into work.
Under these undisputed facts, as applied in Hope, no material factual disputes existed that
would preclude summary judgment.
For these reasons, as more fully set forth below, the District Court appropriately
granted summary judgment and dismissed Appellant's claims against her co-employee,
@

Alice Nelson, for injuries that occurred on their employer's premises.
ARGUMENT

I.

UNDER UTAH LAW, APPELLANT'S RECOVERY IS LIMITED BY
UTAH'S WORKERS'
COMPENSATION
ACT'S
EXCLUSIVITY
PROVISION.

A.

The Purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act is not Only to
Compensate Injured Employees, but Also to Protect Employers and
Co-Employees, such as Alice Nelson, from Co-Employee Tort Claims.

Utah has adopted a Workers' Compensation Act ("the Act") to govern injuries
sustained under certain conditions by employees. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 34A-2-101 et
@

~

~

seq. Specifically, the Act states, in relevant pat1:
(1) The right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for
injuries sustained by an employee, whether resulting in death or not, is the
exclusive remedy against the employer and is the exclusive remedy against
any officer, agent, or employee of the employer and the liabilities of the
employer imposed by this chapter is in place of any and all other civil
liability whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to the employee or to the
employee's spouse, widow, children, parents, dependents, next of kin,

6

heirs, personal representatives, guardian, or any other person whomsoever,
on account of any accident or injury or death, in any way contracted,
sustained, aggravated, or incurred by the employee in the course of or
because of or arising out of tlte employee's employment, and an action at
law may not be maintained against an employer or against any officer,
agent, or employee of tlte employer based upon any accident, injury, or
death of an employee . ...
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(1) (2008) (emphasis added). As set forth in the Act, when

~
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an employee is injured by a co-worker "in the course of or because of or arising out of
the employee's employment," the injured employee "may not" file a lawsuit against her
employer or co-worker, and all civil liability is replaced by the remedies provided by the
Act. See id. (emphasis added).
This Act "represents a compromise between employee and employer under which
an injured employee receives a simple and speedy procedure which eliminates the
expense, delay and uncertainty in proving fault, while the employer is granted immunity
from suit by the employee." Gudmundson v. Del Ozone, 2010 UT 33,
1059.

1 28,

232 P.3d

This compromise grants co-employees the same immunity from suit as their

employer. See id.; see also Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105( I) . This compromise was
further explained by the Utah Supreme Court in Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird Corp.:
The workers' compensation system constitutes a quid pro quo
between employers and employees. See Hunsaker v. State 870 P.2d 893,
899 (Utah 1993 ). Under the Act's balancing of rights, "employees are able
to recover for job-related injuries without showing fault ... and employers
are protected from tort suits by employees," id., by virtue of the Act's
exclusive remedy provision ....
Shattuck-Owen, 2000 UT 94,

1

19, 16 P.3d 555. The Act also precludes an injured

employee from ~"masquerading" her claims as something other than a Workers~

7
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Compensation tort claim, in an attempt to avoid the exclusive remedy of the Act and
@

bring a third-party action against an employer and/or co-employee. Id. at ,r 20.
Furthermore, the Act is to be liberally construed in favor of holding that the
injured employee is limited to Workers' Compensation benefits, including incidents
which would bar an injured employee from suing another employee. See Utah Home

Fire Ins. Co. v. Manning, 1999 UT 77, ,r 18, 985 P .2d 243. Utah recognizes the:
[L]ong-standing policy that the Workers' Compensation Act should be
liberally construed to effectuate its purposes. See, e.g., Smith v. Alfred
Brown Co., 27 Utah 2d 155, 493 P.2d 994, 995 (1972). In line with that
policy, we have stated that it is "proper to resolve doubt as to whether a
worker was an employee in favor of [the worker being an] employee."
Bennett [v. Industrial Comm 'n], 726 P.2d [427,] 430 [(Utah 1986)]. It
would indeed be inconsistent to resolve doubts in favor of a worker being
considered an employee when the worker is seeking coverage but not in
other situations, such as here, where the worker is being sued by another
employee.

Id. (alterations in original).
The Act and interpreting case law have established clear standards regarding the
application of the Act, and Appellant concedes that an employee who is injured by

ti>

another employee "in the course of employment" is limited to the Act's remedies.
Equally clear under binding case law is the Act's underlying policy, i.e., to protect not
just an injured employee, but also a negligent employer and negligent co-employees from
liability in a third-party action.

Gudmundson, 2010 UT 33,

See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2- l 05( 1) (2008);

,r 28,232

P.3d 555; and Manning, 1999 UT 77,

P.3d 1059; Shattuck-Owen, 2000 UT 94,

,r 18, 985 P.2d 243.

8
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19, 16

B.

Pursuant to the Act, an Employee is Acting Within the Course of Her
Employment While Walking in an Employee Parking Lot Headed into
Work.

Utah appellate courts have been called upon numerous times to interpret the
meaning of "in the course of ... employment" as that statement applies to employees
seeking (or attempting to avoid) the Act. See, e.g., Hope v. Berrett, 756 P.2d 102 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988); Soldier Creek Coal Co. v. Bailey, 709 P .2d 1165 (Utah 1985); Murray v.
Utah Labor Commission, 2012 UT App 33, 271 P.3d 192; Drake v. Indus!. Com 'n of
Utah, 904 P.2d 203 (Utah App. 1995); State Tax Comm 'n v. Industrial Comm 'n, 685 P.2d

1051 (Utah 1984); Manning, 1999 UT 77, 985 P.2d 243; and Shattuck-Owen, 2000 UT
94, 16 P.3d 555. In fact, this Court has specifically been asked to opine on whether an
individual who was injured by a coworker in an employee parking lot on her way into
work was in the course of her employment at the time of the accident, therefore limiting
her remedies to those provided by the Act. See Hope, 756 P.2d.
The Hope case is squarely on point and dispositive of Appellant's claims.

In

Hope, this Court was asked to consider whether an accident that took place in an

employee parking lot prior to the beginning of the working day was in the "course of
[employees'] employment." Id. at 103. There, as here, "the parties were both civilian
employees of the United States Government." Id. at 102. The plaintiff was "walking
from the parking lot to her place of employment." Id.

The "plaintiff was struck by

defendant's privately owned vehicle" while the plaintiff was walking in the parking lot,
and prior to reporting to her workstation. Id. Likewise, the ""[d]efendant had just arrived
at [vmrk] and was preparing to park prior to beginning his working day.~· Id. Following

9
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that accident, the plaintiff "filed a complaint against defendant in state court alleging her
injuries resulted from the negligent and careless manner in which he operated his
vehicle." Id. The district court dismissed the plaintiffs action against the defendant, her
coworker. Id. The district court held that the Act precluded seeking damages against the
defendant, because Workers' Compensation benefits were "the exclusive remedy in this
case, the accident having occurred on the employer's premises, even though the
employee had not yet arrived at her workstation." Id. at 102-03.
This Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action on the basis that the
accident occurred "in the 'course of [the plaintiffs] employment,"' even though the
plaintiff had not yet arrived at her workstation. Id. at 103. This Court noted that:
Travel to and from work is not generally considered to be "in the course of .
. . employment." However, there are two exceptions to this going-to-andfrom-work rule. Under the first exception, the accident is covered if it
occurs on the employer's premises, even if the employee has not yet arrived
at his work site or has already left the work site.
Id. (quoting Soldier Creek Coal Co. v. Bailey, 709 P.2d 1165, 1166 (Utah 1985). This
Court further stated:

"The employer's property line provides a bright line test for

application of the premises rule, based on the logic that while the employee is on the
employer's premises, his connection with employment is both 'physical and tangible."'
@

Id. (quoting Soldier Creek, 709 P .2d at 1166). As a result, this Court held: "In view of
these clear dictates, we conclude that both parties were in the scope and course of their
employment when the accident occurred," affirming the District Court's dismissal of the

@

third-party action against the defendant. Id.

10

The application of this "parking lot rule," or also more broadly known as the
"premises rule," is not unique to Utah law. An overwhelming majority of states have
adopted this same rule as a "bright line test for," see id. (quoting Soldier Creek, 709 P.2d
at 1166), determining whether an accident occurred in the course of employment, thereby
placing the injury under the purview of the states' respective Workers' Compensation
statutes. 1 The application of the premises rule in Hope and Soldier Creek is a wellestablished, and overwhelmingly supported position.

1

Recognition of this parking lot/premises rule is not unique to Utah. See, e.g.,
Municipality ofAnchorage v. Robertson, 35 P.3d 12 (Alaska 2001), the Supreme Court of
Alaska applied the premises rule to an employee's claims after that employee was injured
while crossing a public street from a parking lot, which the employee paid to park at a
"discounted rate," even though the injury occurred on a street that was not part of the
employer's premises. Id. at 13. The court held that the employee's injury was covered
by Worker's Compensation, which conclusion was "supported by a well-recognized
application of the 'premises rule."' Id. at 13-14. The court further pointed out that the
premises rule is applied by "courts of most states." Id. at 14; Doctor's Bus. Serv., Inc. v.
Clark, 498 So.2d 659 (Fla. App. 1986) (holding that an employee was entitled to
compensation for injuries sustained on public sidewalk while coming from employer's
parking lot to employer's office building during lunch hour); Pitkin v. Western Constr.,
733 P.2d 727, 728 (Idaho 1987) (recognizing that exceptions to the coming-and-going
rule include "incidents where the employee is on the employer's premises in the vicinity
of the actual situs of his employment"); King Waterproofing Co. v. Slovsky, 524 A.2d
1245, 1248 (Md. App. 1987) (stating: "Ordinarily, injuries sustained by an employee
while 'going or coming' from his or her place of employment are not compensable under
the Workmen's Compensation Act because they do not arise out of and in the course of
employment. Two exceptions to this general rule are the 'premises rule' and the
'proximity rule.' The former 'applies when an employee is injured on the premises of the
employer and while going to or from his or her job."' (internal citations omitted)); MGM
Mirage v. Cotton, 121 Nev. 396, 400, 116 P.3d 56 (Nev. 2005) (holding that the
employee was covered by Worker's Compensation benefits as she "was on the
employer's premises as she walked from the employer's parking lot to the employer's
sidewalk entrance about ten minutes before she was scheduled to work [when s]he
tripped over the curb, part of the workplace environment, and injured her ankle.");
Dupper v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. JC. Penney Co., 734 P.2d 743 (N.M. 1987) (adopting
the premises rule to apply to an employee who was injured after she tripped on a
11
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C.

The District Court Correctly Held that Appellant's Remedies for Her
Alleged Injuries are Limited to Worker's Compensation.

In applying the premises rule in Hope, the District Court properly dismissed
Appellant's district court action against her co-worker, Ms. Nelson. As explained above,
@

Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(1) prohibits Appellant from filing suit against any coemployee if her claimed injuries occurred in the course of her employment, which has
specifically been held by this Court to include any injuries sustained by an employee
injured by a coworker while on her way into her office building. See Hope, 756 P.2d
102.
The District Court in this current matter compared the virtually identical, and
undisputed, facts of Appellant's case to Hope. Namely, Appellant and Ms. Nelson were
involved in an automobile/pedestrian accident; they were both government employees;
the accident took place in their Employee Parking Lot; Appellant was headed in to work
at the time of the Accident; likewise, Ms. Nelson had not yet began her workday; Ms.
Nelson was operating a privately owned vehicle; and neither party had yet reported to

@

their workstation. See Hope, 756 P.2d at 102-03 (holding that Worker's Compensation
was the plaintiffs exclusive remedy for her injuries since at the time of the accident the

,i)

@

@

sprinkler on her way to the employee parking lot after she had clocked out of work for
the day); Lollar v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 S.W.2d 143, 148 & 150 (Tenn. 1989)
(noting that "nearly all jurisdictions" apply the premises rule, and "the great majority of
jurisdictions consider parking lots owned or maintained by the employer for employees to
be part of the premises." Further holding that ··a worker who is on the employer's
premises coming to or going from the actual work place is acting in the course of
employment;· and "that if the employer has provided a parking area for its employees,
that parking area is part of the employer's premises regardless of whether the lot is also
available to customers or the general public.'").
12

parties were co-workers, the plaintiff was in their employee parking lot, the plaintiff was
walking into her place of employment, the plaintiff was struck by a coworker's private
vehicle, the defendant was also just beginning his workday, and neither party had
reported to their workstation). By removing the names, the facts of this case and Hope
are interchangeable.
Based on these undisputed facts, the District Court appropriately held the
following:

I.

2.
3.

4.

5.

The case of Hope v. Berrett, 756 P .2d 102 (Ut. App. 1988) is
controlling law. Additionally, the Hope case is factually similar in
all material respects to the facts of the instant case.
Applying the "premises rule" as stated in Hope, both plaintiff and
defendant were on the employer's premises and in the course of their
employment when this accident occurred.
Plaintiff sustained an on-the-job injury which was caused by a coworker on the employer's parking lot which was designated for
employees to park.
Plaintiff is only entitled to pursue a workers' compensation claim
pursuant to Utah statutes.
Plaintiff cannot maintain a personal injury lawsuit against her coemployee, defendant Nelson.

(R. 373-74.)

Because the District Court appropriately followed the legal precedent set by the
Utah Supreme Court in Soldier Creek, and applied again by this Court in Hope-which is
the overwhelming majority opinion across the country-this Court should affirm the
District Court's holding.
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II.

APPELLANT CANNOT PLEAD AROUND THE ACT'S EXCLUSIVITY
CLAUSE BY BRINGING AN ACTION IN DISTRICT COURT.
A.

Appellant Collected Workers' Compensation Benefits, and is Limited
to Those Benefits made Available to Her Under the Act, Provided
Appellant Cooperated with the Workers' Compensation Investigation.

First, it was undisputed in the District Court that Plaintiff collected some Workers'
Compensation benefits from the Accident. (See R. 248.) "By definition, if an employee
is collecting workers' compensation benefits under the Act, his injury occurred within the
course of his employment because that is a prerequisite to the receipt of benefits."
Stamper v. Johnson, 2010 UT 26,

~

16,232 P.3d 514.

Appellee anticipates that Appellant may attempt to downplay this undisputed fact
by expanding on her one-sentence conclusory statement-which was made without
providing any citation of factual support-from her Summary Judgment Opposition
i)

Memorandum, that: "Plaintiffs Workers' Compensation benefits were denied precisely
because the subject accident did not occur on her employer's premises and because
Defendant and Plaintiff both were not in the course and scope of their employment." (R.

@

189.) However, contrary to Appellant's factually incorrect and unsupported assertion, the
Office of Workers' Comp Programs sent a letter on June 8, 2012 to Appellant as a
follow-up to its March 1, 2012 letter informing her of deficiencies in her claim and giving
her thirty (30) days to address those deficiencies. (See Addendum A, p. 1.)2 In the June
2012 letter, Appellant was informed that she "'failed to respond to the questions regarding
2

@

@

While this document was not included as part of the Appellate Record, it is the only
evidence showing the basis for Appellant's Workers' Compensation benefits withdrawal;
Appellant cited no evidence to support her conclusory, and factually untrue, statement
regarding the withdrawal of Workers' Compensation benefits.
14

the location of your injury, whether you were on agency premises, and specifically what
activity was being performed at the time. Therefore, there is insufficient information on

record to determine whether you were in the performance of duty." (See Addendum A,
p.2 (emphasis added).) Appellant was specifically informed in that two-page letter that:
Under the PECA, an injury sustained by a plant employee, having fixed
hours and place of work, while going to or coming from work is generally
not compensable because it does not occur in the performance of duty.
However, exceptions to this rule have been declared and one suclt
exception is the premises rule: an employee driving to and from work is
covered under workers' [sic] Compensation wltile on the premises of the
employer.
Id. (emphasis added). The Office of Workers' Comp further informed Appellant that:

"The premises doctrine is applied where it is affirmatively shown that the employer
owned, maintained, or controlled the parking facility, used the facility with the owner's

special permission, or provided parking for its employees." Id. (emphasis added). The
Office of Workers' Comp provided Appellant with the direction on how to appeal its
decision to withdraw benefits based solely on Appellant's failure to provide sufficient
information. Despite Appellant being given a clear direction and opportunity to provide
the additional information that would have shown that the Accident occurred in the
parking lot "provided for the IRS employees," thereby continuing the previously obtained
Workers' Compensation benefits, Appellant elected not to provide the requisite
infonnation to the Office of Workers' Comp. See id.

Instead, Appellant improperly

chose to abandon her Workers' Compensation claim and file a civil action against her
coworker, Ms. Nelson.

Appellant cannot, by failing to cooperate in a Workers'

15

(j

Compensation claim, somehow transfonn her claim into one that did not arise on the
@

employer's premises.
Regardless, even if Appellant had not received any Workers' Compensation
benefits for this Accident, and the Court elects to not consider the Office of Workers'
Comp letter sent to Appellant, the undisputed facts in this case still prevent Appellant
from filing a civil suit against Ms. Nelson. See Section I, supra.

B.

The Court is Bound by the Precedent Set Forth in Soldier Creek,
Which was Previously Applied in Hope.
1.

In Determining Whether Appellant and Ms. Nelson Were CoEmployees at the Time of the Accident, this Court Should Apply
the Liberal Workers' Compensation Rulings and Purposes, and
Not the Strict Standards Used in Non-Workers' Compensation
Negligence Settings.

In detennining whether an employee was in the course of employment at the time
of an accident, the employee status tests are applied liberally, with the facts resolved in
favor of applying coverage under the Act. See Murray, 2012 UT App 33,

,r 6, 271

P.3d

192 ("The Act is to be construed liberally, resolving any doubt as to an employee's right
(i

to compensation in favor of the employee.~~) (aff d by Murray v. Utah Labor

Commission, 2013 UT 3 8, 308 P .3d 461 ); see also Drake, 904 P .2d at 207 ("[T]he Act
should be liberally construed and applied to provide coverage." (quoting State Tax

Comm 'n, 685 P.2d at 1053)). In addition, as discussed above:
The Workers' Compensation Act is intended not only to compensate
employees for job-related injuries~ but also to protect them against liability
for job-related conduct. The exclusive remedy provision of the Act makes
this latter purpose clear:

16

The right to recover compensation pursuant to the provisions
of this title for injuries sustained by an employee ... shall be
the exclusive remedy against any officer, agent or employee
of the employer . . . and no action at law may be maintained
against an employer or against any officer, agent or employee
of the employer based upon any accident, injury or death of
an employee.
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60 (1988) (emphasis added). The protection
against suit provided by this section extends to any employee ....
Manning, 1999 UT 77,

,r 21, 985 P.2d 243 (alterations and citations in original).

In Manning, a temporary construction employee of Holmes & Narver, Manning,
was injured when scaffolding he was standing on collapsed.

Id. at

,r

3.

®l

Manning

collected Workers' Compensation benefits from Holmes & Narver, and then filed suit
against Green, a former Holmes & Narver subcontractor. Id. at ,r,r 2-5. Manning argued
that since Green was an independent contractor, he was not a coworker, and Manning had
an independent third-party cause of action against Green. Id. at

,r 6.

The propriety of a

negligence action against Green centered on whether he was considered an "employee"
under the Act. The district court held that "for purposes of the Workers' Compensation
Act, Green was an employee of Holmes & Narver and was therefore immune from
Manning's suit under the exclusive remedy provision." Id. at

,r

7. In that third-party

lawsuit, the Utah Supreme Court turned to the definitions provided in the Act, as well as
case law interpreting who constitutes an "employee" under the Act. Id. at

,r,r 9-11.

In

applying the Workers' Compensation standard, the Supreme Court held that Green
qualified has an employee under the Act, regardless of the "intended relationship~~
between Green and Holmes & Narver. Id. at ,r,r IO & 13. The Supreme Court stated:
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~

We conclude, therefore, that the district court did not err in ruling as
a matter of law that Green was an employee of Holmes & Narver for
purposes of the Workers' Compensation Act ....
As an employee under the Workers' Compensation Act, Green is
entitled to the protections the Act affords, including the protection against
suit for injuries sustained by other employees of Holmes & Narver.

Id. at ,r,I 18-19.
The Utah Supreme Court has directly acknowledged the contrast between liberal
Workers' Compensation standard and the stricter standard applied in third-party
negligence cases:
We break no new ground by applying different standards of review
to scope-of-employment cases derived from vicarious liability and workers'
compensation cases. In Ahlstrom, we anticipated the arrival of this appeal
when we stated that
[w]ith very different presumptions governing worker's
compensation and negligence cases, it would not be wise to
hold that the rules governing scope of employment questions
in one area are wholly applicable to the other because the
legal effect of identical facts may be different in a negligence
case than in a worker's compensation case.

Salt Lake City Corp. v. Labor Commission, 2007 UT 4,
Ahlstrom v. Salt Lake City Corp., 2003 UT 4,

,r

,r

18, 153 P.3d 179 (quoting

7, 73 P.3d 315). Understanding the

underlying policy differences between accidents governed by Workers' Compensation
@

and third-party negligence actions in which an injured non-employee attempts to bring an
action against a tort-feasor's employer under respondeat superior, the Utah Supreme
Court explained that "the application of the going and coming rule to a single event may

@

result in treating a person as an employee for the purpose of establishing eligibility for

@
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workers' compensation benefits while withholding employee status for the purpose of
making the employer liable to third persons." Id. at ,r 4.
To prevent injured employees from attempting to plead around the Act's
exclusivity provision, this Court must follow the lead set by the Utah Supreme Court by
examining Workers' Compensation rulings under the Act's liberal standards and
analyses, and ignoring those in non-Workers' Compensation cases. See, e.g., Id.
As illustrated by the reasoning in Salt Lake City Corp., failing to apply the Act's
liberal course of employment standard to a determination of whether the Act applies to a
given set of facts, regardless of the forum in which the claim is brought, defeats the intent
and policies created by the Workers' Compensation System.

More specifically, an

individual who would be considered an employee under the liberal standard applied to
Workers' Compensation cases, but not an employee under the stricter third-party
v1canous liability cases, could avoid the Act's exclusivity provision by filing a
negligence claim instead of a Workers' Compensation claim. See id. Allowing such a
strategic action by an employee in an attempt to avoid employee status for her injuries,
would destroy the mutually beneficial intent of the Act by allowing an employee to
subject a coworker to a negligence action that the coworker should have been protected
from under the Act. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-l 05( 1) (2008); Gudmundson,
2010 UT 33,

ii 28,232

P.3d 1059; Shattuck-Owen, 2000 UT 94,

,r

19, 16 P.3d 555; and

Manning, 1999 UT 77, ,r 18, 985 P.2d 243.
This case is not the first time a party has attempted to '"plead around the workers'
compensation exclusivity provision.'~ See, e.g.~ Shattuck-Owen, 2000 UT 94, ,i 18, 16
19

~

P.3d 555. In Shattuck-Owen, an employee attempted to plead a third-party cause of
@

action against her employer for injuries she sustained by framing her claim as "one for
breach of contract," which would not be excluded under the Act. Id. at

11

18 & 21.

Recognizing the plaintiffs attempt to plead around the exclusivity provision of the Act,
(j

The Utah Supreme Court "prevent[ed the] employee[] from evading the recovery
restrictions of the Act" by reasoning that "the exclusive remedy provision extends far
enough to bar what are essentially tort claims masquerading as breach of contract
claims." Id. at ,I 20.
Even though Appellant has not attempted to masquerade her claims as something
@

other than a tort claim, Shattuck-Owen illustrates the need for the Court to prevent
Appellant from "evading the recovery restrictions of the Act" by attempting to frame this
action as a "third-party negligence" case. Utah precedent, along with well-established
policy underlying the Act, requires the Court to disregard Appellant's request to take a
novel approach and overrule legal precedent by applying a stricter course of employment
standard to this Workers' Compensation issue. As such, as explained in Section I, supra,
this Court should analyze the undisputed facts of this case under the appropriate
Workers' Compensation standard and hold, as it did in Hope, that Appellant was within

~

the course of her employment at the time of the Accident. The bottom line is that this
case involves an employee attempting to sue her co-employee. It does not involve a nonemployee attempting to hold a tort-feasor's employer liable for negligent acts.

@
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2.

The Cases Relied upon by Appellant to Argue a More Narrow
Approach to Determining the Employee Statuses of Appellant
and Ms. Nelson are Limited to Respondeat Superior Claims, and
are not Applicable for Determining the Applicability of the Act's
Exclusivity Provision.

Appellant argues that a string of cases following Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771
P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989), have "sub silentio" overruled Hope and, by necessity, Soldier
Creek. (See App. Brief, p. 13, subsection I.f.) However, the cases cited by Appellant do
not support this conclusion.
(/4\

\&\1,1

First, Appellant points to Birkner in an attempt to skirt around both the liberal
application and exclusivity clause of the Act, and ultimately narrow the analysis used to
evaluate the employment statuses of Appellant and Ms. Nelson. However, Birkner does
not support a departure from the well-established rules in Soldier Creek and Hope. In
Birkner, the Utah Supreme Court was asked to answer whether an employer, Salt Lake
County, could be vicariously liable for sexual misconduct perfonned by its employee,
Mr. Flowers, against the non-employee plaintiff, Ms. Birkner. Birkner, 771 P .2d at 105556. Ms. Birkner, was not employed by Salt Lake County; Mr. Flowers was no a coemployer of the claimant. As such, any claims brought by the injured party, Ms. Birkner,
would have no application to the Workers' Compensation Act. When Ms. Birkner filed a
lawsuit against Mr. Flowers' employer, Salt Lake County, under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, the Supreme Court articulated a three-part test to determine whether
the actions of Salt Lake County could be vicariously liable for the acts of Mr. Flowers
based on whether Mr. Flowers exceeded the scope of his employment. Specifically, the
Birkner Com1 explained that in order for an employer to be liable to a third-party for the
21

I

acts of its employee, the employee's acts must: (I) "be of the general kind the employee
@

is employed to perform," (2) "must occur within the hours of the employee's work and
the ordinary spatial boundaries of the employment," and (3) must be motivated, at least in
part, by the purpose of serving the employer's interest." Id. at 1056-57.
The purpose of this three-part test is to protect an employer from liability owed to
a non-employee third-party, for the independent acts of a rogue employee. See id. at
1057 (stating "If the employee acts 'from purely personal motives . . . in no way
connected with the employers' interests' or if the conduct is 'unprovoked, highly unusual,
and quite outrageous,' then the master is not liable." (quoting Prosser and Keeton on the

@

Law of Torts§ 70 at 506 (5th ed. 1984))).
Appellant admits that this three-part Birkner test is, as explained above, more
restrictive than the standard applied under the Act-which serves to provide no-fault
coverage for an injured employee, while protecting the employer and other employees
See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-105(1 );

from liability for those injuries.
Gudmundson, 2010 UT 33,

~

28, 232 P.3d 1059; Shattuck-Owen, 2000 UT 94,

P.3d 555; Manning, 1999 UT 77,

~

~

19, 16

18, 985 P.2d 243; and Hope, 756 P.2d at 103.

Expanding the use of the Birkner test beyond respondeat superior cases to Workers'
@

Compensation cases would be an unprecedented step, ignore the intent of the Act, and as
more fully explained above, effectively allow an injured party to choose which "'course of
employment" standard to apply based on where that injured party decided to pursue her

@

@

claim.
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Appellant cites three other cases, which she alleges follows the footsteps of

Birkner and overrules Hope and therefore Solder Creek: Clover v. Snowbird, 808 P.2d
1037 (Utah 1991); Ahlstrom, 2003 UT 4, 73 P.3d 315; and Salt Lake City Corp., 2007 UT
4, 153 P.3d 179. Again, none of these cases support Appellant's attempt to abandon

Hope.
In light of the discussion on Birkner above, Clover and Ahlstrom require little
discussion.

As with Birkner, both Clover and Ahlstrom are cases in which non-

employees attempted to hold employers vicariously liable for the acts of their employees.
In both of these cases, there was no possibility that Workers' Compensation benefits
would be available to the injured parties, as the injured parties were not employed by the
named employers, and were not co-workers of the alleged negligent employees.

Clover, 808 P.2d at 1038-40; Ahlstrom, 2003 UT 4,

,r,r 1-6, 73 P.3d 315.

See

As such, neither

of these cases have any application to the matter before this Court, i.e., whether
Appellant's legal remedies are limited to Workers' Compensation benefits.
By contrast, Salt Lake City Corp. did involve a Worker's Compensation issue and
clearly highlights the different standards used in a Workers' Compensation case. In Salt

Lake City Corp., the Utah Supreme Court addressed the same accident involved in
Ahlstrom; however, the claimant in Salt Lake City Corp. was not the injured nonemployee plaintiff in Ahlstrom, but rather the injured Salt Lake City's employee, Ms.
Ross, whose was the tortfeasor in Ahlstrom. Salt Lake City Corp., 2007 UT 4,
P.3d 179.
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,r

3, 153

Q)

In the underlying case of Ahlstrom, the court examined the coming and going rule
as it applies to Ms. Ross, an off-duty city police officer. Ultimately, the court held that
Ms. Ross was not acting in the course and scope of her employment, thereby relieving
Salt Lake City from being vicariously liable. Ahlstrom, 2003 UT 4,

if 18, 73 P.3d 315.

As a result of the decision in Ahlstrom, Salt Lake City appealed the Labor Commission's
decision to provide Workers' Compensation benefits to Ms. Ross for the accident,
arguing that the coming and going rule also precluded Workers' Compensation benefits.
Salt Lake City Corp., 2007 UT 4,

ilil

1-4, 153 P.3d 179. However, despite previously

holding that Ms. Ross was not in the course of employment in relation to the third-party
@

vicarious liability claim, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed the decision to award
Workers' Compensation benefits. Id. at 4. The Supreme Court explained the potentially
apparent contradictory holding by reasoning that, as stated in subsection 11.B. l. above,
"the application of the going and coming rule to a single event may result in treating a
person as an employee for the purpose of establishing eligibility for workers'
compensation benefits while withholding employee status for the purpose of making the
employer liable to third persons." Id. at

if 4. As cited above, the Salt Lake City Corp.

Court clearly recognized and set forth the different standards used in Workers'
@

Compensation cases with vicarious liability cases. (See subsection II.B. l, supra.)
The Salt Lake City Corp. Court made it clear that~ as contrasted to cases not
involving potential Workers' Compensation claims, the Court's job is to "'look closely to

@

assure ourselves that the Commission has liberally construed and applied the Act to
provide coverage and has resolved any doubt respecting the right to compensation in
24

favor of an injured employee." Id. at , 18. And, "[ u]nlike Ms. Ross' s quest for benefits,
the Ahlstrom plaintift's were not entitled to a sympathetic application of the going and
coming rule in aid of their effort to make Salt Lake City vicariously liable for Ms. Ross's
negligence." Id. at, 17.
As explained herein, Salt Lake City Corp. bolsters the District Court's decision to

@

dismiss Appellant's claims, and further supports the distinction between applying stricter
standards such as the Birkner test in respondeat superior cases, while applying the liberal
standard provided by the Act, Soldier Creek, Hope, and any other cases addressing
potential Workers' Compensation benefits and restrictions.

C.

Appellant's Hypotheticals are Answered by the Standard Set Forth in
Hope and Soldier Creek.

Appellant uses two hypotheticals to open her Argument, namely: Hypothetical #I,
an employee is injured by a co-worker and both individuals were "clocked-in to work,"
and both were "performing work-related acts;" and Hypothetical #2, an employee is
injured by a co-worker, however the injury occurred "a mile from their job," and "neither
were performing any work-related acts." Appellant argues that the Act precludes a thirdparty action in Hypothetical #I, while Hypothetical #2 is not governed by the Act.
Appellant's assertions may be correct; however, neither of these hypotheticals analyze
the facts that exist in this case, nor do they provide any additional insight to the propriety
of applying Hope and the '"premises rule" to the facts of this case.
The Utah Supreme Court and this Court have both acknowledged the existence of
a clear boundary ,vith respect to whether an employee is covered under the Act when that

25
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employee was injured on the employer's premises. Under the current and well-accepted
application of Workers' Compensation analysis-as explained in the Act, Soldier Creek,
and Hope-when an employee is injured by another employee while the employers are
on their way to work, "the employer's property line provides a bright line test for
application of the premises rule." Hope, 756 P.2d at 103 (quoting Soldier Creek, 709
P .2d at 1167). This conclusion is "based on the logic that while the employee is on the
employer's premises, his connection with employment is both 'physical and tangible."'

Id. (quoting Soldier Creek, 709 P.2d at 1167). As summarized by the Soldier Creek
Court, "If the premises rule were distorted to cover this case, it would create a distinction
@

difficult to justify and hard to apply in future cases." Soldier Creek, 709 P.2d at I 167.
Applying this clear, bright line of the universally accepted "premises rule" to
Appellant's hypotheticals: the limited factual scenario in Hypothetical #1 would likely
result in coverage under the Act, while the limited factual scenario in Hypothetical #2
would likely preclude benefits under the Act. However, under either hypothetical, if a
lawsuit ensued and benefits for either party under the Act were being claimed, the
District Court would be required to analyze the parties' respective employment statuses
under the liberal standard required for Workers' Compensation claims. See, e.g., Salt

~

Lake City Corp., 2007 UT 4,

~,l

17-18, 153 P.3d 179; Hope, 756 P.2d at 103; and

Manning, 1999 UT 77, ~ 21, 985 P .2d 243.
More importantly, setting hypotheticals and the assumptions, speculation, and
@

factual holes that necessarily exist with such hypotheticals, aside, there are clear,
undisputed facts in Appellan(s current claims. These facts, virtually identical to Hope,
26

clearly demonstrate as a matter of law, that at the time of the Accident, Appellant and
Ms. Nelson were co-employees on their shared employer's premises, and their

@

"connection with (their] employment [was] both 'physical and tangible."' See Hope, 756
P.2d at 103 (quoting Soldier Creek, 709 P.2d at 1167).

III.

THERE ARE NO MATERIAL FACTUAL DISPUTES PRECLUDING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

ct

Lastly, whether Appellant was injured in the course of her employment, and
therefore subject to the Act's exclusivity provision, is "a question of law." See, e.g.,

ii

Drake v. Indus!. Com 'n of Utah, 904 P .2d 203, 205 (Utah App. 1995).

Appellant argues that the District Court "made findings of fact on disputed issues
of critically material fact[s]," and cites to the Appellate Record at 369. 3 (See Appellant's
Br., p. 18.)

However, Appellant incorporates the substance of the District Court's

"Findings of Facts" in her own statement of facts in her Brief before this Court. For
example, the District Court noted that:

"The accident occurred in the parking lot

designated for employees of the IRS."

(R. 373,

,r

9; see also R. 369,

,r

9.)

By

comparison, Appellant's statement of fact no. 3 states: "The building where Mrs. Brown
worked had a designated parking lot for the employees." (See Appellant's Br., p. 3,

,r 3.)

While Appellant expresses concern over the District Court's use of the term "designated"
in regards to the Employee Parking Lot, Appellant chose to use the exact same term to

3

Appellant cites to the unsigned Proposed Order granting Summary Judgement instead of
the signed Order. Since the "Findings of Fact" in the Proposed Order at R. 369, and
Findings of Fact in the signed Order at R. 373 are identical, Appellee presumes it was a
simple mistake.
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@

describe the Employee Parking Lot in her own statement of facts. ( Compare Appellant's

®

Br., p. 18, with Appellant's Br., p. 3, iI 3.)
Appellant attempts to create an "issue of fact" by arguing over who actually
"owned" the Employee Parking Lot. However, while an employer's ownership and/or
control of real property would certainly be indicators of an employer's "premises," lack
of title or control over real property is not a dispositive factor in analyzing the premises
rule. As explained by the Utah Supreme Court in Soldier Creek, using property lines as a
bright line test for application of the premises rule is "based on the logic that while the
employee is on the employer's premises, his connection with employment is both

<i

'physical and tangible."' Soldier Creek, 709 P .2d at 1167. Actual ownership or control
of an employee parking lot does not change the "physical and tangible" connection of an
employee and her place of employment.
In fact, if lack of title or control of real property precluded an area of real property
from being deemed as an employer's "premises" under the liberal application required
under the Act, then since the IRS only leases the IRS Building where Appellant and Ms.
Nelson work, no "premises" exists in which Appellant would be covered under Workers'
Compensation. However, such rationale is not the standard for determining "premises."

@

Notably, in Hope, there is no discussion of who actually owned or controlled the parking
lot in which the accident took place, only that the parking lot and the building were ~'both
located on the Defense Depot Odgen, Utah's facility," and that the parking lot was used

@

@

by Defense Depot Ogden, Utah ~s employees. Hope, 756 P.2d I 02.
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As testified by Appellant in her deposition, the undisputed facts of this case
provide a clear boundary line for the IRS' s premises: for example, inter alia, the

@

Employee Parking Lot was connected to the IRS Building; the entire premises was
surrounded by a guarded fence with a single guarded entry; the only entrance and exit
from the IRS Building was through the Employee Parking Lot; Appellant and Ms. Nelson

®

were required to present employee identification prior to entering the Employee Parking
Lot; employees were not permitted to bring weapons into the Employee Parking Lot; and
employees used the Employee Parking Lot during fire drills.

By Appellant's own

testimony, the Employee Parking Lot and the IRS Building were both used by IRS
employees in conjunction with their employment. (R. 102, 121-24, and 145-47.)

CONCLUSION
Based on the undisputed facts of this case, as applied to clear Utah precedent and
sound, well-accepted policy, and for the reasons more fully set forth above, Appellee
respectfully requests that this Court apply the Workers' Compensation Act's exclusivity
provision and affinn the District Court's dismissal of Appellant's negligence action
against the estate of her coworker, Ms. Nelson, for the work-related Accident that
occurred on her employer's premises.

Respectfully Submitted.

DATED May ~2016

SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C.

~~)
~-CHARDK.GLAUSER
,.,
DA VlD E. BROWN
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
The Estate ofAlice Nelson
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@

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Smith & Glauser, P.C., attorneys for Defendant/Appellee hereby certify that on the
9 day of May, 2016, two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF THE
@

APPELLEE were mailed, postage fully prepaid to the following:

J Bradford DeBry
ROBERY J DEBRY & ASSOC.
4253 South 700 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107
T: (801) 262-8915
F: (801) 262-8995
Attorneys for Appellant

DATED

May !l!!:2016

SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C.

Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
The Estate of Alice Nelson
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ADDENDUM
A.

Office of Workers' Compensation Letter to Marjorie Brown

B.

Final Order from the District Court

C.

Utah Code Ann.§ 34A-2-105

D.

Deposition Excerpts Cited in Appellee's Brief, Including Photo Exhibits

@

31

ADDENDUM
A

File Number: 12f
nodpod-D-1

)97 4

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMP PROGRAMS
PO BOX 8300 DISTRICT 12 DEN
LONDON, KY 40742-8300
Phone: (303) 202-2500
May 9, 2012
Date of Injury: 01/30/2012
Employee: MARJORIE A. BROWN

·-~.,·

MARJORIE A BROWN
1953 SOUTH 4700 WEST
ROY, UT 84067

-.
..;..·-

Dear Ms. BROWN:

NOTICE OF DECISION

0

·-·......

N

Your claim for compensation is denied because the evidence does not establish that you were
injured in the performance of duty as required for coverage under the Federal Employees'
Compensation Act (FECA).
On 02/21/2012 you filed a claim for Traumatic Injury indicating you sustained an injury or medical
condition on 01/30/2012 as a result of your employment as a File Clerk with the Department of
Treasury in Ogden, UT. Specifically, you stated that the Injury or condition occurred when you were
hit by a car in the parking lot on your way to work.
Along with your claim, we did not receive any additional Information with your claim. This was not
sufficient because it does not support the factual element of your claim, ie. that injury occurred as
alle~ed and It resulted In a medical diagnosls; it does not show that you were injured in the
performance of duty; and it does include a physician's explanation of how the incident caused or
aggravated the medical condition.

On 03/01/2012 this office advised you of the deficiencies in your claim and provided you the
opportunity to submit additional evidence. You were asked to' provide a narrative statement with
further detail of what happened and to explain whether you were on agency premises, what assigned
duties you were performing at the time or exadly what you were doing, if off premises where you
were in relation to the agency premises, and indicate whether the parking lot is owned by the
employer. You were also asked to submit a medical report with dates of examination and treatment,
description of your symptoms, results of examinations and tests (including MRI and CT scans),
diagnosis, clinical course of treatment provided, and the effect of such treatment, description of the
specific employment duties/activities given by you to the physician, a physician's opinion supported
by a medical explanation as to how work actiVitles In your Federal employment caused, contributed
to, or aggravated your medical condition. You were provided 30 days to submit the requested
information.

In response to our development letter, we received the following evidence: authorization for
examination CA-16 dated 2-7-12, a statement of incident dated--1~30-12, and hospital report dated 1- 30-12, several physician assistant reports dated 3-7-12, and a treating report from Dr. Amann dated
2-7-12 diagnosing you with pain in the neck/upper back and arm Dr. Amann opined your problems
are stable. Dr. Amann describes that you were struck by a car and assessed shoulder pain and chest
wall contusion. The hospital notes dated 01/30/2012 diagnosed a lumbar strain, acute cervical strain,
and contusion:

!';_!9l17l)(11/
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In order for a claim to be accepted under the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (FECA). the
claim must meet 5 basic elements. The claim must:

c1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

(5)

Be ttme1v €Ued;
Be made by a Federal,ClVU>Emplovee.

Establish'Fact ofliiluN. which has both a factual and medical component. Factually, the
injury, accident or employment factor alleged must have actually occurred. Medically, a
medical con~ition must bl;) _d!t:19nosed In connection with the injury or event.
Establish•Peffomiaoce':ofOutv. The injury and/or medical condition must have arisen
during the course of employment and within the scope of compensable work factors.
EstabllshJDausafRelationsh1Q; which means the medical evidence establishes that the
diagnosed condition is causally related to the injury or event.

You have established that you are a Federal civilian employee who filed a timely claim; that the
injury, accident or employment factor occurred; and a medical condition has been diagnosed In
connection with the injury or event. However, after a thorough review of all evidence, your claim for
compensation is denied because the rourth basic element, Performance of Duty, has not been met.
Under the FECA, an injury sustained by a plant employee, having fixed hours and place of work,
whi!e going to or coming from work is generally not compensable because it does not occur in the
performance of duty. However, exceptions to this rule have been declared and one such exception is
the premises rule: an employeedrivjng to and from work is covered under workers' Compensation
while on the premises of the e_mp(oyer. 1
You failed to respond to the questions regarding the location of your injury, whether you were on
agency premises, and specifically wha1 activity was being performed at the time. Therefore, there is
insufficient information on record to determine whether you were in the performance of duty.2
Based on these findings, your claim is denied on the fourth basic element, Performance of Duty,
because the requirements have not been met for establishing that you sustained an injury and/or
medical condition that arose during the course of employment and within the scope of compensable
work factors as defined by the FECA. Medical treatment is.not authorized and prior authorization. if
any, is terminated.
-Your employing agency will charge any previously paid Continuation of Pay to your sick and/or
annual leave balance or declare it an overpayment.
If you disagree with this decision, you should carefully review the attached appeal rights, and pursue
whichever avenue is appropriate to your situation.
Sincerely,

1t·cwwu4-tfvonne
Canner
Senior Claims Examiner
HopeJ.Kahler(RogerA. Kahler), 39 ECAB_
.. (1988).
Mere use of a parking facility, alone, is not sufficient to bring the parking rot within the "premises" of the
emproying establishment. The premises doctrine is appl!ed where it is affirmatively shown that the employer
owned, maintained, or controlled the parking facility, used the facility with the owner's special permission. or
provided parking for its employees. Diane Bens miller, 48 ECAB _ (Docket No. 95-3108, issued September
15, 1997).
1

2
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Enclosure: Appeal Rights
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DEi 'ARTMENT OF TREASURY
IRS-NATIONAL OFFICE (INCLUDES SERVICE CENTERS)
IRS WORKERS' COMPENSATION CENTER
400 NORTH 8TH STREET. BOX 7B
RICHMOND, VA 23219
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Case Number: 12505C
Employee: MARJORIE A. BROWN
Date: May 9, 2012

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION ACT APPEAL RIGHTS
If you disagree With :ttie,~tta#lie,d 'd.e~i,fo~,_yClµ)have tll~;_rlgi)J to:request-a~ .1pp~I. If you:wist\,
to req Liest a_rr a,ppea1! you tifiq~'jt':revl~wf~~~s:e:,p~·~a~}ig_~ts ca_reful Jy a 11.d ~ec:id~Wh ict.- a ppaal ..
to reqµest.. The.te.-are:3ijiff.eteof:types9f,ppijal-a!1 otitUned.beli:>W, ¥.OU,MAY10,Nl;.Y
.
REQU.EST ONE~TVPE:O_F.APPEA;J;. A't'TffJ~fjlME.

Piace::.tn;i.X;',c,n·tt,eatb_l'ched fr,ri:T.J·J_i'idf~;;t~ri'g~ljf¢1Hli>p~at·you_ are. r~qu~stlng. :cq,npJ_Elt~11te,
inf.oini~tlon reqµe.siec1:,~~~~)~~1'.<>tf( qf'Jh'~J'.~~fW:, '.P,J~fo~illeJ~rm,op .~:OP :of ?O.YJn.~ti!ria.t ,you are

•submlttlhg~.:·ntiti'rnaU'thehfd~·vitJh·~~~h~~f.its l9'the.,a~.:t'rtt.&~ 11~~(;1 fqr,_;t))~:;w.p@ pf~pp&~).
:that,-Y_iou,select.r
:;Ahia}I.s'!,vitlt!ifttie'it.i'
a,oni.
-·:e:ah':fSu1,areire
. . . ·...
. .. ,
.. !l-.1:P,_
... _...l?P.:
)Y., ._._ .. _ q_'uesiiil
.· ... g on;:the:outsitlts·dfihe
. .. .... . . ........... .
enveJo1:>e;(11HEA~l~G REQUl:f,T'\~R'l:C:QJ:,~1.DERATION REQUEST", or "ECAB REVIEW''),

NOTE • If you have a substantially limiting physJc.il or,mental impairment, fed~tal disability
nondlserl,ntnat1on law/gives you the righHo rec~lve, help-from,DFEC Ira the-form of
communicat10111as~1starfoe, accommo#~tion and modification to atd you In the FECA claims
process. For example,·we will provide you with copies of documents In alternate formats,
communication services such as sign ranguage Interpretation, or other kinds of adjustments
or changes to account for the limitations of your disability. Please contact the appropriate
office below to ask about this assl5tance.
·

1. HEARi NG: If your Injury occurred on or after July 4, 1966, and you have not requested
reconsideration, as described below, you may request a Hearing. To protect your right to a he~ti[Jg,
any request for a hearing must be made before any request for reconsideration by the DistricfOffice'·
(5 U.s.c_ 8124(b)(1)). Any hearing request must also be made in writing, within 30 calendar
days after the date of this decision, as detennined by the postmark of your letter. (20 C.F.R.
10.616). There are two forms of hearings, both conducted by a hearing representative. You may
request either one or the other, but not both.
a. Oral Hearing. An informaf orarhearing iseonducted at a location near your home or by
teleconferenceMdeoconference; You may present oral testimony and written evidence in support of
your claim. Any :person authorized by you in wriUng may represent you atan oral hearing. At the
discretion of the hearing representative, an oral hearing may be conducted byteleconference or
vldeoconference.
b_ Review of the Written Record. You may submit additional written evidence, which must be sent
with your request for review. You will not be asked to attend or give oral testimony.
2. RECONSIDERATION: If you have additional evidence or legal argument that you believe wm
establish your claim, you may request, in writing, that OWCP reconsider this decision. The request
must be signed, dated and received within one caiendar year of the date of the decision. ft
must clearly state the grounds upon which reconsideration is being requested, and be accompanied
by relevant evidence not previously submitted, such as medical reports, sworn statements, or a legal
argument not previously made, which apply directly to the issue addressed by this decision_ A person
other than those who made this decision will reconsider your case. (20 C.F.R. 10.605-610)

3. REVIEW BY THE EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION APPEALS BOARD (ECAB): If you believe
that all available evidence that would establish your claim has already been submitted, you have the
right to req!Jest rt:,.vtew b.YJb~ -~QA~ (?O c._f,.g. JO.q2~)., The ECAB wHI review. only the evidence.
received prior to the date of this decision (20 C.F.R. Part 501). Request for review by the ECAB
must be made within 180 days from the date of this decfs1on. More information on the new Rules
is available at www.dol.gov/ecab.

no.,;7,';r.11,
~, ·-" •
•
,
•
... •y '
#
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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMP PROGRAMS
PO BOX 8300 DISTRICT 12 DEN
LONDON, KY 40742-8300
Phone: (303) 202-2500
June 8, 2012
Date of Injury: 01/30/2012
Employee: MARJORIE A. BROWN
BRADFORD DERBY
ATTORNEY
ROBERT J. DERBY AND ASSOC

42~2 S 700E
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84107
Dear Sir/Madam:
Th!s Is in response to your recent request for information.

•

As of 6/8/2012, disbursements as the result of this injury were reported as:

Comp~nsatlon (pay)
Compensation (medical)

$ 0.00
$ 5951.13

Enclosed are printouts of the bill payment and compensation histories in the above-referenced case.
If you have any questions, please contact me at the above address or call me at (303) 202-2500.

Sincerely,

J

\.lt

\

7

l

l~ltrlt[itt~

Customer Service Representative

DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
IRS-NATIONAL OFFICE (INCLUDES SERVICE CENTERS)
IRS WORKERS' COMPENSATION CENTER
400 NORTH 8TH STREET, BOX 78
RICHMOND, VA 23219

If you have a disability (a sub~tantially limiting physical or -~ental Impairment), please.contact our
offlce/cfalms examiner for Information about the kinds of help available, such as communlccrtion
assistance (altern&te formats or sign language fnfcrpretation), accommodations and modffidatihris} 7 / /. 8 1 )
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ADDENDUM
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...t 1t{ft~~t.itt~i,

The Order of Court is stated below:
,l ,
Dated: May0l,2015
Isl EmieW.\
09:06:08 AM
Districf.'Co
'"'p;

'·{~'t

J.J
' t'

~J!-;~!°:'!~l~i'.}tf!~

Michael J. Walk, Bar No. 6675
Trystan Smith & Associates
136 South Main Street Suite 520
Salt Lake City, UT 8410 I
Telephone: (801) 257-7200
Facsimile: (801) 257-7215
Attorneys· for Defendant Alice Nelson
Employees of the Corporate Law Depa1tment
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
--

----·

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH, OGDEN DEPARTMENT
- - - - - - - - -

---•--------·-·

I

'

MARJORlE ANN BROWN,
Plaintiffs,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

V.

THE ESTATE OF ALICE NELSON,

Civil No. 130906495
Judge Ernest Jones

Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on February 25, 2015, for hearing on Defendant Estate
of Alice Nelson's (Defendant) Motion for Summary Judgment. J. Bradford Debry and Michael

L. Banks appeared on behalf of plaintiff.

J. Bradford Debry made arguments to the Comt.

Michael J. Walk appeared on behalf of defendant and made arguments to the Cou11. Having
reviewed the matter, including the briefs and submissions of the parties, the relevant case law,
having heard argument from the parties, and for good cause appearing, the Court hereby issues
the following Ruling and Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
@

The Court makes the following findings of undisputed material focts:
I. Plaintiff Maijorie Brown (Plaintiff) was involved in an auto/pedestrian accident on

0372
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January 30, 2012 at approximately 4:55 am.
2. Plaintiff had worked for the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) since 2007.
3. The IRS office where plaintiff worked is located at 1973 North Rulon White Boulevard,

Ogden, Utah.
4. On the morning of January 30, 2012, plaintiff parked her car in the parking lot at 1973

North Rulon White Boulevard, which was designated for IRS employees to park while at
work.
5. Plaintiff was walking through the parking lot to report to work when she was struck by a
private vehicle driven by Alice Nelson.
6. Defendant Alice Nelson worked for the IRS for approximately 14 years.
7. Defendant worked at the IRS office located at 1973 N011h Rulon White Boulevard,

Ogden, Utah.
8. Defendant was driving in the parking lot located at 1973 No11h Rulon White Boulevard,

to park and report to work when the accident occmTed.
9. The accident occuned in the parking lot designated for employees of the IRS.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
This Court makes the following conclusions of law:
1. The case of Hope v. Berreu. 756 P.2d I 02 (Ut. App. 1988) is controlling law.

Additionally, the Hope case is factually similar in all material respects to the facts
of the instant case.

2. Applying the ''premises rule~· as stated in Hope~ both plaintiff and defendant were
on the employer's premises and in the course of their employment when this
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accident occurred.
3. Plaintiff sustained an on-the-job injury which was caused by a co-worker on the
employer's parking lot which was designated for employees to park.
4. Plaintiff is only entitled to pursue a workers' compensation claim pursuant to
Utah statutes.
5. Plaintiff cannot maintain a personal injury lawsuit against her co-employee,
defendant Nelson.
For the foregoing reasons, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED
that:
1. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.

2. Plaintiffs exclusive remedy was under the workers compensation statutes.
3. Accordingly, all claims by plaintiff in the complaint against defendant are hereby

DISMISSED, with prejudice and on the merits. This is a full and final order of this
Court disposing of all issues alleged in the complaint.
The Order of the Court is approved and dated as indicated above in the upper right-hand
corner of this document with the Com1's Official Stamped Order and Date.

Approved as to form:

J. Bradford DeBry
Michael L. Banks
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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ADDENDUM
C

Utah Code

34A-2-105 Exclusive remedy against employer, and officer, agent, or employee of employer.
(1) The right to recover compensation pursuant to this chapter for injuries sustained by an
employee, whether resulting in death or not, is the exclusive remedy against the employer
and is the exclusive remedy against any officer, agent, or employee of the employer and the
liabilities of the employer imposed by this chapter is in place of any and all other civil liability
whatsoever, at common law or otherwise, to the employee or to the employee's spouse,
widow, children, parents, dependents, next of kin, heirs, personal representatives, guardian,
or any other person whomsoever, on account of any accident or injury or death, in any way
contracted, sustained, aggravated, or incurred by the employee in the course of or because
of or arising out of the employee's employment, and an action at law may not be maintained
against an employer or against any officer, agent, or employee of the employer based upon any
accident, injury, or death of an employee. Nothing in this section prevents an employee, or the
employee's dependents, from filing a claim for compensation in those cases in accordance with
Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act.
(2) The exclusive remedy provisions of this section apply to both the client and the professional
employer organization in a coemployment relationship regulated under Title 31A, Chapter 40,
Professional Employer Organization Licensing Act.
(3)
(a) For purposes of this section:
(i) "Temporary employee" means an individual who for temporary work assignment is:
(A) an employee of a temporary staffing company; or
(B) registered by or otherwise associated with a temporary staffing company.
(ii) "Temporary staffing company" means a company that engages in the assignment of
individuals as temporary full-time or part-time employees to fill assignments with a finite
ending date to another independent entity.
(b) If the temporary staffing company secures the payment of workers' compensation in
accordance with Section 34A-2-201 for all temporary employees of the temporary staffing
company, the exclusive remedy provisions of this section apply to both the temporary staffing
company and the client company and its employees· and provide the temporary staffing
company the same protection that a client company and its employees has under this section
for the acts of any of the temporary staffing company's temporary employees on assignment
at the client company worksite.
Amended by Chapter 318, 2008 General Session
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In The Matter Of:
Brown v.
Nelson

Maijorie Ann Brown
August 18, 2014

Q & A Reporting, Inc.
1872 South Nlain Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
801.484.2929

Original Fi le 08- l 8-14 - Brown Ma1jorie Ann_ I .lxt
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Marjorie Ann. Brown
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Brown v.
Nelson
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Page 17
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4

5
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7
8

9
10
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12
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14
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16
17
18
19
20
21

22
23
24

25

1
it's too expensive on gas, so we have a little car now.
2
Q. Okay. So it still works, it just-3
A. Yeah.
Q. -- would probably need to pass inspection so you
4
5
need a new windshield -A. Yeah.
6
7
Q. -- and then, otherwise, it probably would work?
A. Oh, yes.
8
9
Q. Okay.
A. Very expensive on gas.
10
Q. Okay. By chance, do you know the address of
1l
the -- of where you work?
12
A. 1973 North Rulon White Boulevard. That's
13
R-0-L-U-O-N [sic] White Boulevard, Ogden, Utah. I don't 14
know the ZIP code.
15
Q. Is there anybody else besides the IRS that works
16
in that building?
17
A. Just the security guards.
18
19
Q. So -- and I just -MR. BANKS: I'm just going to place an objection. 2 o
21
Lacks foundation and form.
22
Q. (By Mr. Walk) So, like, is there -- like, here in
my building, you know, there's lawyers, there's architects, 23
there's all kinds of people. Is there anybody besides the
24
25
IRS?

A. Yes.
Q. Unlike my building, you can't just walk into it,
correct?
A. No. You can't.
Q. So -- and is that true both -- at every entrance
to the building, there is -- is it a guard posted?
A. There's only one entrance.
Q. One entrance?
A. Yes. And there is a guard.
Q. So there may be other exits in case there are
emergencies or something, there's probably some emergency
exit? Or does everybody have to file out that one door?
A. There -- are you talking doors or gates to the
parking lot?
Q. Sorry. Let's start with the building itself. And
I may not have been clear.
A. Okay.
Q. Thank you for helping me clarify that.
But I want to ask you about the building itself.
Is there more than one entrance to the building?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And at each of those entrances to the
building, is there a guard posted there?
A. No.
Q. Okay. Where there's not a guard posted there, are
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A. No.
MR. BANKS: Same objection. Lacks foundation.
Calls for speculation.
Q. (By Mr. Walk) So when you go to work-- and back
on that day, on the day of the accident, when you went to
work, you parked in the -- is there a designated parking lot
for you employees?
A. It's - yeah. The whole thing -- area is a
parking lot.
Q. Yeah. And do other businesses park there?
A. No.
MR. BANKS: Objection. Calls for speculation.
Q. (By Mr. Walk) So -- and let me ask you about
that. So when you say "nobody else parks there," how do you
know that?
A. It's a federal - it's a federal building. It's
locked. It's a secure building. You have to have security
clearance to get on there.
Q. To get on the property?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Just, like, to go into the building, you
have to have your -A. Homeland Security badge.
Q. You've got to have your badge and credentials and
whatever to get in, right?

Min-U-Script®
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there -- is the door unlocked or is it locked?
A. No. You have to scan your badge, and then it'll
let you out, or scan your badge to get in. You have to have
that Homeland Security badge to scan to let you in.
Q. Okay.
A. On the entrance that has the guard, you can just
walk in and then they have to look at your badge.
Q. Okay. They look at your badge and that's where if
someone were a visitor, ifl had business there, I could go
there and I'd check in with the guard and he would give me a
visitor pass or whatever?
A. You'd have to get clearance first to get through
the gate to come and be a visitor.
Q. Okay. So let me ask you about that, when you talk
about the gate. So there's a gate and a fence that
surrounds the building?
A. Yes.
Q. And there's only one entrance into the fenced
area?
A. Yes. There is another gate, but that is chained
shut, and that is only used in case of -- if there was an
emergency and everyone had to leave the parking lot, like a
bomb threat.
Q. Right.
A. That would be then opened, but they would post a

Q & A Reporting, Inc.

Marjorie Ann Brown
August 18, 2014

Brown v.
Nelson

Page 23
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security guard there.
Q. Yeah. To make sure nobody comes in~3
A. In or out. And they would also check your badge
4 going out.
s
Q. Okay.
6
A. But I've never seen that unlocked, ever,
7 unchained.
8
Q. Do emergencies like that happen in your building?
A. Occasionally.
9
Q. Have you ever had to evacuate the building?
10
l.1
A. No.
l.2
Q. Okay. Other than maybe a drill, a fire drill
l.3 or something like that?
A. Yes. But we do not leave the parking lot. We
3.4
is just go outside of the building.
16
Q. But as far -- as long as you've been working
1 7 there, you've never had an actual emergency where they've
l. a made everybody evacuate the whole building and the parking
l.9 lot?
20
A. No.
Q. Okay. So in order to get into the parking area,
21
22 what do you have to do there?
A. You have to pull up to the gate, and the security
23
2 4 guard has to read your badge, make sure it's current, and
25
then allow you in.

18

from you so you just can't get in at any time.
Q. Okay. It's not like it goes inactive. They take
it back and either reissue it or give you a new one?
A. It'll go inactive, yes. They take it and then you
have to get it reactivated all over again Q. Okay.
A. - when you come back to work.
Q. Do they ever discuss with -- I assume this would
happen -- sorry, but I'm not sure -- do they ever discuss
with you whether it would be wrong to just hop the fence?
MR. BANKS: Objection. Form. Vague and
ambiguous.
Q. (By Mr. Walk) You know, have they ever -- and I'm
just wondering, maybe if they send a memo or something and
say, "Reminder, nobody should be climbing the fence."
MR. BANKS: Same objection.
Q. (By Mr. Walk) Sorry. Go ahead.
A. We have the security patrol the whole area, plus

19

we have German Shepherds that have to - they also patrol.

1

1

2

2
3

4
5.

6
7

8

9
10
11

12

13
14
15
l.6

l. 7

2 O Because they have to check every truck of mail that comes in

21
22

23
24
25

for explosives, drugs.
Q. Contraband?
A. Right. Whatever. So, you know, you're -- when
you're a new employee, of course you have that orientation
where, you know, you're not allowed to bring certain items

Page 22

Page 24

24

Q. Okay. ls there some sort of a bar or a gate or
1
2
something that's closed until he lets it open, or is it just
open, you just have to stop there?
3
A. It's open and you have to stop.
4
Q. Okay. I want to show you what I think is a
5
6
photograph of what you described for me. I want to see if
7
that's correct. So is that the gate and -A. Yes.
8
Q. -- security area you were talking about?
9
10
A. Yes, it is.
11
Q. Okay. For my reference, I'm going to attach that
12
as Exhibit- I to your deposition.
And so anybody who needs to get into that building 13
-- well, sorry. Let me ask it this way, too: If someone -- 14
1 saw that there were some bus slops near the area.
15
A. Out here on the main road.
16
17
Q. If someone were to drive -- ride the bus and get
off, would you still have to walk through the security gate? 18
A. Yes. You do. You have to still come to him or
19
her and they have to see your badge and he has to clarify 20
21
that it's -22
Q. Still valid?
A. -- still valid and let you in.
23
Well, they tal,e your badge when it's no longer -- 24

25

like, s;1y you're furloughed. They will hike your badge away

1
2
3

4
5
6
7

8
9

10
11

12

13
14
15
16
17
18

19
2o

21

22
23

in. You cannot have any kind of weapons or anything like
that. You can't- you wouldn't be able to get over that
fence. It's too tall.
Q. Okay.
A. But they drive -- the security drives trucks
constantly. They have their trucks and they're continually
on patrol. They go all the way around.
Q. Patrolling the whole property?
A. The whole - yes.
Q. Okay. ls it your understanding, then, with the
very -- it sounds like, and I want to make sure, if I'm not
saying this correctly, please tell me -- but with a very
rare exception, the only people in the building and getting
into the parking lot are employees of the IRS?
MR. BANKS: Objection. Calls for speculation.
And leading. And lacks foundation.
THE WITNESS: I'm not sure.
Q. (By Mr. Walk) Do you know generally how many
people work in that building at any one time?
A. I do not.
Q. Are there different shifts throughout the day?
A. Just two. There's a daytime shift and a nighttime
shift.
Q. Okay.
25
A. But the only time there's a -- they collapse the
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nighttime shift when people are furloughed. When our season
slacks off, then they will do what they say is collapse the
nighttime shift and bring what few perms there are on nights
up to days. And then when we get busy again, they'll start
the night shift again. And they'll take perms to be
managers and such over the night group.
Q. Okay. And generally, when is that - I know it's
not exactly, but when is the heavy season for you guys?
A. It depends, because we have different forms. Our
1099s, which are quarterly returns, each have their own
peak. And then our main big peak is, of course, April 15th,
but - and I'd say about two to three weeks prior to Apri1
15th, and then it runs probably a good month aftenvards, if
not maybe a month and a half.
Q. Okay. Just for my information, so, did you know
Alice Nelson?
A. Is that the lady that hit me?
Q. Yeah.
A. No.
Q. Okay. Never had seen her before?
A. No.
Q. To your knowledge, you never worked with her in
any capacity?
A. No.
Q. Okay. So do you recall when you entered that day,
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that is shown on any of those?
A. Yes. Okay. The main entrance is right here.
This is where we would go -- I was going in.
Q. Okay. Will you do me a favor and just write kind
ofon the building right there, "main."
MR. BANKS: Let's do this, can we mark these
each -MR. WALK: Sure.
MR. BANKS: I don't think they're -- are they
marked yet as 2 and 3, I, 2 and 3?
MR. WALK: She hasn't put the sticker on yet,
but-MR. BANKS: Can we put the stickers on them?
MR. WALK: Sure.
MR. BANKS: So we can keep track of them?
MR. WALK: Sure.
(Exhibit-I, Exhibit-2, and Exhibjt-3 were marked
for identification.)
Q. (By Mr. Walk) Okay. So I want you to -- on
Exhibit-2 here, will you just write for me where the main
entrance is. And that's where the sidewalk goes, right?
A. Yes.
Q. And it walks into the building. And that is the
main entrance?
A. Yes.
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do you remember where it was you parked?
A. I always parked the same place when I used to
drive. You can almost see it. It's, like, the second row.
You have your visitor's parking right here, on the very end.
Q. I'm going to show you a different one and see if
we can -A. Oh.
Q. -- do this. This is exhibit -- so I've got a
couple of them here, and I want to show them both because
I'm not quite sure which one is applicable, and what -- so
let me show you one which I'll mark as Exhibit-2 first.
And I think that is an overview of the whole
parking lot -·
A. Yeah.
Q. -- and the building; is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. And I see kind ofup on the top comer sort
of up there is the -- and I want to make sure that's correct
-- I think that's the guard shack, right?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. Then -- and I'm not sure if -- I may not
have got the right one, and we can -- I might be able to go
grab another one, if that is not. So can you show me where,
perhaps, if you remember, generally where you parked where
-- if you do remember, exactly where you parked that day, if
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Q. Is that generally where you would go when you
would come to work?
A. At that time, yes.
Q. Do you remember at that time, back when this
accident happened in January 2012, did you ever use any
other entrance to get into the building?
A. No.
Q. Okay. So generally -- and, well, and on that day
of the accident, do you recall where it was you specifically
parked?
A. I always parked in this row right here.
Q. So -A. Depending on which area was - which spot was
open, I would park right in this area.
Q. Okay.
A. So I could just come straight through there.
Q. Okay. And so that's -- you've kind of marked that
on Exhibit-2 with a rectangle and a line?
A. Yes.
Q. That's generally the area you parked?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay. On that date, did you park in that area?
A. Yes.
Q. And you may not remember the exact stall, but,
again, it was that area?
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A. It was in that area. Yes.
Q. Okay. Do you know, are there -- so you were
3 saying at the time you may have worked -- sorry -- had a
4 start time at either 5 o'clock or 6 o'clock?
5
A. Six o'clock.
6
Q. Do you know, does that -- are there different
7 shifts that start still at those different times?
B
A. Yes. Just at 5:00 to I :30, and - they have 5:00
9 to 1:30, 6:00 to 2:30, and there is a few that come to work
10 at 7:00 to 3:30.
Q. Okay.
11
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A. Very few.
Q. Okay. So the main -- the bulk of the employees

12

either come at 5:00 •·
A. They come at 6:00.
Q. -- or 6:00? The bulk come at 6:00. Okay.
And that's -- so that's probably true, then, when
you came -- if you.were coming at 5 o'clock that day, you
generally had your pick of the parking spots?
A. Well, yes, I would say. I'm not sure. I don't
remember. But I know I parked in that area.
Q. Okay. Do you remember the weather that day?
A. It was very cold. My hair froze to the cement
when my coffee spilled, so it was very cold.
Q. Do you remember it snowing or --
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A. No.

l

Q. -- raining or anything, I mean, other than being a

2

cold January morning?
A. No. It wasn't snowing or raining, that I can
4
5 recall.
6
Q. Do you know if there was any snow left on the
7 ground, or had it all been cleared and -A. They keep the parking lot plowed. They have to.
8
Q. Plowed. And do they also provide -9
10
A. They salt.
Q. They salt it?
11
12
A. They do.
13
Q. Okay. So unless it's snowing, generally, the
14 parking lot is well kept up?
15
A. Yes.
16
Q. And you don't remember there being any snow on the
17 ground or a concern that morning al all?
A. No, I don't.
18
19
Q. Okay. And so after parking your car -- sorry. I
20 don't know that it maltcrs, but when you park your car, do
21 you generally pull straight into the stall or some people -22
A. Yes.
23
Q. -- tum around and back in?
24
A. No. I pull in.
25
Q. You don't do that. You pull in. Okay.
3

Were there any issues that you remember parking
that morning? ·
A. No. Ordinary morning.
Q. Yeah. Okay.
So then can you explain to me, just describe for
me, when you got out of your car, from there until when the
accident happened, what happened? What do you remember?
A. I got out of my car. I stopped here to check and
make sure there's nothing coming.
Q. When you say "stopped here," where is that? Would
you describe that?
A. This is where the cars go in between the parking
- this is the driving lanes, I would say.
Q. Okay.
A. And I crossed the driving lane when it was clear.
I came to -· I came through the parking areas here -- to the
driving lane that's right in front of the building.
Q. Okay.
A. I stopped. A car was turning down here at the
very end by the visitor's parking. That's these stalls
right there (witness indicating).
Q. Will you write for me, will you write "visitor"
across those so that we know -- yeah.
A. I was right here in front of the main crossing
area.

Q. Okay.
A. The headlights had just turned down the road by

the visitor's. I proceeded to walk across here. The
4
headlights -- I didn't - I stopped looking because I
5 thought I had - l would have had plenty of time.
6
Q. Okay.
7
A. I started walking across. I turned. The
8 headlights were right on top of me. I can still see it.
9
All I had time to think was, "I'm going to get hit." And
10 then I got hit.
11
Q. Okay. So I want to -- see, is this -- this is a
12 little bit -13
A. Bigger.
14
Q. -- closer picture of where you were describing,
15 right?
16
A. Yes.
17
MR. BANKS: Arc you talking about Exhibit-3?
18
Q. (By Mr. Walk) Yeah. So -- and let me ask -- hang
19 on, before you do that. So do you remember when you walked
20 through that last row of parking stalls -21
A. Yes.
22
Q. -- I see that there is a part in between some of
23 the handicap srnlls that has lines -24
A. That's the walkway.
25
Q. Yeah. And that's generally where people walk?
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